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Marshaling in Bankruptcy: Questioning the Recent
Expansions to the Common Debtor Requirement
The 1980s, and now the 1990s, have shown an ever-increasing
number of start-up ventures. In order to secure credit for their
fledgling companies, entrepreneurs generally have to personally
guaranty loans made to their companies. In addition, major credi-
tors often require small corporations to grant security interests in
corporate property. However, smaller creditors do not require se-
curity interests in property or personal guarantees from the corpo-
ration's principals.' The entrepreneur is thereby able to leverage2
his company by the increased use of unsecured (and non-guaran-
teed) credit provided by trade creditors.
In the case of bankruptcy, the secured party3 receives the value
of its security from the estate4 and the remaining estate property is
distributed to the unsecured creditors. If there is no remaining
property, the unsecured creditors get nothing, and the secured
creditor is able to satisfy any deficiency by exercising its rights
1. Small creditors like office supply merchants generally do not require security in-
terests or guarantees because the value of the goods being sold are nominal and the adminis-
trative expenses involved in procuring security interests would be prohibitive. These small
creditors can protect themselves by demanding "cash on delivery" if they believe that the
buyer is a credit risk. Larger creditors, like equipment lessors, require security interests and
personal guarantees because the value of the goods being leased to the buyer are high
enough to warrant the administrative expenses incurred to protect the creditor.
2. Black's Law Dictionary 816 (West, 5th ed 1979) defines leverage as "the use of a
smaller investment to generate a larger rate of return through borrowing."
3. Black's Law Dictionary 1215 (West, 5th ed 1979) defines a secured party as a
"lender, seller or other person in whose favor there is a security interest . . . " and a se-
cured creditor as a "creditor who holds some special pecuniary assurance of payment of his
debt, such as a mortgage, collateral, or lien."
4. In bankruptcy, the creditor's status as a secured party is determined through Sec-
tion 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 USC § 506 (1990). After achieving secured status in
bankruptcy, the secured party may request a relief from stay under § 362(d). 11 USC §
362(d) (1990). If the relief of stay is granted, the secured party is free to use state law,
including common law, to recover on its claim. Id. If the relief from stay is not granted, the
secured party must rely on the Bankruptcy Code to protect its claim. If the petitioner files
under Chapter 7, Sections 724(b) and 725 provide for the distribution of property to
lienholders of the property. 11 USC §§ 724, 725 (1990). Under Chapter 11, the secured party
is protected by Section 1129(7), which requires that any claim holder within a class that is
impaired by the reorganization plan either vote for the plan, or receive the same amount
under the plan as they would in a liquidation under Chapter 7. 11 USC § 1129(7) (1990).
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under the personal guaranty. Therefore, normally, the entrepre-
neur's liability on the guaranty is limited to the difference between
the loan amount and the liquidation value of the property securing
the loan. Does the entrepreneur, then, have a false sense of secur-
ity as to his exposure on the guaranty being limited to the differ-
ence between the amount of the loan and the value of the property
securing it? He may, if the bankruptcy court in his jurisdiction fol-
lows the recent expansions of the equitable doctrine of
marshaling.
5
The main issue posed by this comment is when should a per-
sonal guarantor of a corporate debt' be considered a 'common
debtor' with the corporation, so that the doctrine of marshaling
can be applied. The comment will first introduce the marshaling
doctrine using a traditional fact pattern. Thereafter, the proce-
dural requirements that must be met to bring forth a motion to
marshal assets will be discussed. The next section of the comment
will describe the expansions of the marshaling doctrine. Following
is an application of each expansion to a hypothetical fact situation.
The final section of this comment will call for the judiciary to limit
the expansion of the doctrine to those factual situations where the
individual guarantor has acted inequitably or where there is suffi-
cient evidence to pierce the corporate veil.
MARSHALING IN GENERAL
Traditionally, the marshaling doctrine arose in a real estate con-
text. For example, suppose Adams owns two lots, Blackacre and
Whiteacre, each with a liquidation value of $100,000, after costs.
Adams borrows $125,000 from First Bank and grants a lien in
favor of First Bank on both properties to secure the loan. Later,
Adams borrows an additional $25,000 from Second Bank, granting
Second Bank a lien in Blackacre alone. The following diagram may
help in visualizing the transactions:
5. Black's Law Dictionary 878 (West, 5th ed 1979) defines marshaling as:
arranging, ranking or disposing in order; particularly, in the case of a group or series
of conflicting claims or interests, arranging them in such an order of sequence, or so
directing the manner of their satisfaction, as shall secure justice to all persons con-
cerned and the largest possible measure of satisfaction to each.
Note that the correct spelling of marshaling is with one "1," although some courts use a
double "1." In re Vermont Toy Works, Inc., 82 Bankr 258, 265 n 2 (Bankr D Vt 1987).
6. Hereinafter, the terms "guarantor" and "guaranty" shall mean a personal guaran-
tor or guaranty of a corporate debt.
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At this point, First Bank enjoys a senior secured interest in Black-
acre and the only secured interest in Whiteacre. Second Bank has
a junior (to First Bank) secured interest only in Blackacre.
If Adams defaults on the loan, the only way that First Bank can
recover completely is to foreclose on both properties, receiving
$100,000 from the first property and $25,000 from the second. Be-
cause First Bank has first priority in both properties, it can choose
the order of foreclosure. If it decides to foreclose on Blackacre first,
the entire $100,000 liquidation value will go to First Bank, along
with $25,000 from the foreclosure of Whiteacre. Second Bank
would be left completely unsecured. However, if First Bank fore-
closes on Whiteacre first, both parties will be able to recover fully.
The marshaling doctrine was developed to avoid the inequity in-
volved in permitting a senior secured creditor from acting in such a
way as to prevent a junior creditor from fully recovering on its
claim. Marshaling is an equitable doctrine designed to promote fair
dealing and justice.7 "The equitable doctrine of marshalling [sic]
rests upon the principle that a creditor having two funds to satisfy
his debt, may not by his application of them to his demand, defeat
another creditor, who may resort to only one of those funds."
'8
Thus, a junior creditor may move to compel marshaling if the sen-
ior creditor is acting in such a way as to prevent the junior creditor
from having its charge satisfied. However, marshaling will not be
compelled if the senior secured creditor would be prejudiced.9
Judge Conrad, in In re Vermont Toy Works, Inc.,10 stated that,
7. Meyer v United States, 375 US 233, 237 (1963).
8. Sowell v Federal Reserve Bank, 268 US 449, 456-57 (1925).
9. Matter of Dealer Support Servs. Int'l, Inc., 73 Bankr 763, 766 (Bankr E D Mich
1987). Chief Judge Brody refused to require marshaling of the shareholder guarantors' as-
sets when the guarantors' assets were kept separately and the shareholder guarantors did
not act in such a way as to justify treatment of their assets as belonging to the debtor
corporation. Dealer Support Services, 73 Bankr at 765.
Furthermore, Judge Brody stated that to require a senior secured creditor to "institute
foreclosure proceedings, pay off the balance of the existing land contract, and suffer the
inherent delays and expense of a foreclosure proceeding" would be prejudicial to the senior
secured creditor. Id at 766.
10. 82 Bankr 258 (Bankr D Vt 1987). Judge Conrad held that the shareholder guar-
antor had acted inequitably, breached his fiduciary duty, participated in unfair overreaching
and insider preferences, had grossly undercapitalized the company and had failed to observe
Fund 1: Blackacre
Owned by: Mr. Adams
Value = $100,000
First Bank Lien = $125,000
Second Bank Lien = 25,000
Fund 2: Whiteacre
Owned by: Mr. Adams
Value = $100,000
First Bank Lien = $125,000
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"Ordinarily, marshaling, as an equitable remedy with natural jus-
tice at its keystone, will not be applied if its application results in
substantial injustice, undue delay or demonstrable injury to a
party in interest."" Thus, marshaling has been denied where the
assets to be marshaled were exempt assets and the senior creditor
would face delay and expense in foreclosing. 2 However, in Matter
of Multiple Servs. Indus., Inc.," Judge Clevert invoked the mar-
shaling doctrine, even though the secured creditor was required to
wait for a foreclosure sale of the marshaled assets. 4
Thus, the traditional elements of marshaling are:
1. The existence of two creditors of the same debtor; and
2. The existence of two funds belonging to a common debtor; with
3. Only one of the creditors having access to both funds; 5 with
4. The absence of prejudice to the senior secured creditor if the
doctrine is applied. 6
corporate formalities. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 333. He further held that the ineq-
uitable conduct on the part of the shareholder guarantor warranted piercing of the corpo-
rate veil and that the senior secured creditor would not be prejudiced by the invocation of
marshaling and, thus, marshaling would be applied. Id at 334.
11. Id at 321, citing 53 Am Jur 2d Marshaling Assets § 13 (1970).
12. In re Leonardo, 11 Bankr 453, 455 (Bankr W D NY 1981); Victor Gruen Assocs.,
Inc. v Glass, 338 F2d 826, 830 (9th Cir 1964). In Leonardo, the debtor had given security
interests in his equipment and inventory to three creditors: Central Trust Company (herein-
after "CenTrust"), Westinghouse Credit Corporation (hereinafter "WCC") and the Small
Business Administration (hereinafter "SBA"). Leonardo, 11 Bankr at 454. In addition, the
debtor had given CenTrust a second mortgage on his residence and an assignment of the
debtor's life insurance policies. Id. The residence had a value of $43,000, a first mortgage of
$19,000, the CenTrust mortgage and a federal tax lien of $19,000. Id. The debtor claimed a
$10,000 homestead exemption on the residence and an exemption of the life insurance poli-
cies under New York law. Id. WCC and SBA moved the court to compel CenTrust to mar-
shal against the principle residence and the life insurance policies. Id. The bankruptcy court
refused to invoke marshaling based on the prejudice to CenTrust because of the delay and
increased expenses involved if marshaling were applied. Id at 455.
In Gruen, the Ninth Circuit held that marshaling cannot be invoked where the senior
creditor will be prejudiced or has an increased risk of loss. Gruen, 338 F2d at 830.
But note Matter of Multiple Servs. Indus., Inc., 18 Bankr 635, 637 (Bankr E D Wis 1982),
where Judge Clevert held that when the senior creditor objected to a marshaling order due
to risk of loss, expense and delay, the senior secured creditor would not be prejudiced, and
marshaling would be conditionally granted if the trustee maintained sufficient funds to fully
satisfy the senior secured creditor. Multiple Servs., 18 Bankr at 637.
13. 18 Bankr 635 (Bankr E D Wis 1982).
14. Multiple Servs., 18 Bankr at 637, citing Gruen, 338 F2d 826 (9th Cir 1964), where
the Ninth Circuit found that if the trustee in bankruptcy retains sufficient assets to satisfy
any deficiency to the secured party upon application of the marshaling doctrine, there is no
prejudice to the secured party, even if he has to wait for the foreclosure sale of the mar-
shaled assets. Multiple Servs., 18 Bankr at 637.
15. Meyer v United States, 375 US 233, 236-37 (1963).
16. Gruen, 338 F2d' at 830. The Ninth Circuit held that where there is a risk of loss
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Applying the elements to the hypothetical, if First Bank decides
to foreclose on Blackacre first, Second Bank could request the in-
vocation of the marshaling doctrine. Second Bank will be success-
ful in convincing the court to compel First Bank to foreclose on
Whiteacre first, because all four elements of marshaling are met:
1. First Bank and Second Bank are two creditors of the same
debtor, Adams; and
2. Blackacre and Whiteacre are two funds belonging to the com-
mon debtor, Adams; with
3. Only one of the creditors, First Bank, having access to both
funds, Blackacre and Whiteacre, whereas Second Bank is limited
to only one fund, Blackacre; with
4. The absence of prejudice to the senior secured creditor, First
Bank, because it would have to foreclose on both properties any-
way, only the order of foreclosure is changed by invocation of the
doctrine.
However, when an individual guarantees a corporate debt, he is
not considered a "common debtor" with the corporation because
the corporation is a separate entity. Judge Sauls expressed this
concept in Farmers and Merchants Bank v Gibson,
17
to a senior secured creditor, marshaling will not be compelled. Id.
17. 7 Bankr 437 (Bankr N D Fla 1980). Judge Sauls held that where a shareholder
guaranteed a working capital loan with personally owned assets, these assets may be consid-
ered an equitable contribution of capital, under a reliance theory, and thus subject to mar-
shaling. Gibson, 7 Bankr at 441. Judge Sauls further stated that in order to reduce potential
prejudice to the bank (the senior secured creditor), the bank would be permitted to recover
from property in the corporate name, and that its lien would be transferred to the trustee
through equitable subrogation. Id at 443. The trustee would then be able to marshal the
assets of the guarantor since they have been deemed equitable contributions to capital. Id.
However, this order was vacated and remanded in Peacock v Gibson, 81 Bankr 79 (N D
Fla 1981), by District Judge Higby. Judge Higby held that there was insufficient evidence to
show that the assets of the guarantors should be deemed an equitable contribution of capi-
tal. Peacock, 81 Bankr at 80-81.
On remand, Judge Sauls found the issue moot in Farmers and Merchants Bank v Gibson,
81 Bankr 81, 81-82 (Bankr N D Fla 1984), because there was no surplus after the bank had
foreclosed on all corporate and non-homestead assets of the guarantors, and was still not
fully satisfied. Gibson, 81 Bankr at 81-82. Since the trustee would only be able to marshal
homestead property, which is exempt from claims by the trustee, there would be no assets
that the trustee could marshal. Id. Therefore, the prior orders were vacated. Id.
Judge Sauls' decision was affirmed by Judge Higby in Gibson v Farmers and Merchants
Bank, 81 Bankr 84, 87 (N D Fla 1986). Though the marshaling issue was moot, it is reasona-
ble to expect that the district court would accept the contribution to capital exception to
marshaling, if there was sufficient evidence to show a contribution of capital by the guaran-
tor. In re San Jacinto Glass Indus., Inc., 93 Bankr 934, 940 (Bankr S D Tex 1988), citing
Gibson, 81 Bankr at 87.
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Inasmuch as a corporation is an entity distinct from its stockholders or of-
ficers, as between a senior creditor of the corporation, who can also look to
its stockholders or officers if he has a guaranty, and a junior creditor who
has no guaranty and thus can only look to the corporate assets, the neces-
sary condition of a common debtor does not exist, absent a basis for disre-
garding the corporate entity. 8
Because of the common debtor requirement, courts generally do
not compel a secured creditor to marshal a guarantor's assets in
lieu of the debtor's assets, even when the guarantor is the sole
shareholder of the corporation.19 Though the elements of marshal-
ing are clearly not met when a guarantor's assets are being mar-
shaled, the bankruptcy court in Vermont Toy Works stated,
Bankruptcy Courts are Courts of Equity. They are the gatekeepers of the
fair allocation of assets to creditors. As such, when faced with facts which
demand a remedy for inequitable conduct they have fashioned various ex-
ceptions to marshaling's technical requirements of two or more funds, one
of which would otherwise be considered a non-estate asset.2
0
The recognized expansions of the "common debtor" requirement
are based on:
A. General Equity Principles
B. Equitable Contributions to Capital
C. Inequitable Conduct of the Parties
D. Piercing of the Corporate Veil
21
The following hypothetical fact pattern will be utilized to
demonstrate the application of the expansions of the common
debtor requirement. Your client, Mr. Doe, is president of ABC
Corporation (hereinafter "ABC"). ABC is a closely-held corpora-
tion in the start-up phase with Mr. Doe as its sole shareholder. Mr.
Doe had approached First Bank for a line of credit of $300,000
18. Gibson, 7 Bankr at 440.
19. Id.
20. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 290.
21. It should be noted that once a guarantor is forced to make good on his guaranty,
through an application of marshaling or otherwise, the guarantor becomes "subrogated to all
the rights of the creditor against the principal debtor, including the security given to secure
the debt." Allen v See, 196 F2d 608, 610 (10th Cir 1952). Because of the subrogation rights
of the guarantor, there would be negligible difference in the position of undersecured credi-
tors in bankruptcy. Thus, in bankruptcy, it is also necessary to show the necessity for equi-
table subordination of the guarantor's claim. See Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 331-32.
Black's Law Dictionary 1279 (West, 5th ed 1979) defines subordination as "the act or pro-
cess by which a person's rights are ranked below the rights of others." Section 510(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes the court to use equitable subordination principles
when determining the priority of claims. 11 USC § 510(c) (1990).
Please note that detailed analysis of the doctrines of equitable subrogation and equitable
subordination are beyond the scope of this comment.
314
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three years ago when he incorporated. Mr. Doe believed that with-
out the line of credit, ABC would not succeed. First Bank was will-
ing to extend the credit, but only upon the condition that ABC
would grant a blanket lien on all inventory, accounts receivable,
and personal property then and thereafter owned by ABC. In addi-
tion, First Bank required Mr. Doe to personally guaranty the full
amount of the line of credit.
Although Mr. Doe wanted ABC to succeed, he was not willing to
increase his exposure for the sake of ABC. Mr. Doe, therefore,
completed financial projections that showed that the value of First
Bank's security interest would always exceed the amount of the
line. Mr. Doe was confident with these numbers, and he therefore
fulfilled First Bank's conditions by granting a security interest in
the aforementioned assets and signing a personal guaranty for the
full amount of the debt.
Two years later, ABC needed more capital. Second Bank was ap-
proached for a term loan of $50,000. Although Second Bank did
not require a personal guaranty, it did require a security interest in
the inventory, accounts receivable and personal property then and
thereafter owned by the corporation (a junior lien to First Bank).
Mr. Doe immediately granted the security interest and took the
money. He used $10,000 of the loan proceeds to repay his student
loans. The remainder was used as working capital.
Although ABC has grown from a single employee company to
over thirty employees, the company's financial situation has de-
clined over the last year. ABC owes the full amounts of both loans,
in addition to over $200,000 owed to fifty trade creditors. Mr. Doe
has asked for advice regarding his personal liability if ABC files for
protection from creditors under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. The liquidation value of the inventory, accounts receivable
and personal property is currently $250,000. Although ABC filed
tax returns for each of the past three years and maintained de-
tailed financial records, it has not maintained records of director or
shareholder meetings (because Mr. Doe was and still is the sole
shareholder and director of the corporation). Trade creditors were
given the two banks as credit references. Mr. Doe recently won the
lottery and currently has a personal net worth that exceeds
$1,000,000.
First Bank would prefer to recover under its security interest in
the corporate assets, because it is planning on a continued business
relationship with Mr. Doe. Both Second Bank and the trustee in
bankruptcy want to pursue a marshaling strategy, so that their
1992
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claims are satisfied. The following diagram is a pictorial represen-
tation of the relationships between the parties:
Fund 1: ABC Corp. Assets Fund 2: Mr. Doe's Assets
Owned by: ABC Corp. Owned by: Mr. Doe
Value = $250,000 Value = $1,000,000
First Lien = $300,000 First Guaranty: $300,000
Second Lien = 50,000
Trade Creditors = 200,000
The traditional elements of marshaling are not met in this fact
pattern because there is no common debtor. Therefore, if Second
Bank and the trustee are to succeed, they must come within an
expansion of the common debtor requirement that the court will
accept.
But before Second Bank can bring the marshaling motion before




D. Burden of Proof
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Jurisdiction
The marshaling doctrine falls within the jurisdictional powers of
the bankruptcy court.2 2 However, before marshaling can be com-
pelled, the court must have jurisdiction over both funds or all nec-
essary parties.23
B. Standing
The marshaling doctrine was developed to protect secured credi-
tors. Accordingly, secured creditors have standing to pursue the
marshaling strategy.
24
According to the United States Supreme Court in Lewis v Man-
ufacturers Nat'l,25 the trustee in bankruptcy has the same status
22. "The bankruptcy courts have long had the power to marshal the debtor's assets
in order to effectuate on [sic] equitable distribution of funds to creditors of the debtor's
estate." In re Tampa Chain Co., 53 Bankr 772, 777 (Bankr S D NY 1985), citing Meyer, 375
US at 236-37.
23. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 290.
24. Id.
25. 364 US 603 (1961). In Lewis, the debtor had borrowed money from Manufac-
Vol. 30:309
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as an existing lien creditor2 6 would have as of the commencement
of the case through the Bankruptcy Act's Strong Arm Statute, Sec-
tion 110(c).27 The trustee is thus a hypothetical lien creditor whose
rights are determined by state law. 8 Although the rights of the
trustee are determined by state law, the prevalence of Section 9-
301(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code,29 which includes the trus-
tee in bankruptcy within the definition of a "lien creditor,"30
should make the resolution of this issue uniform throughout the
states that have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. Once rec-
ognized as a secured creditor, the trustee has standing to move for
marshaling of the debtor's assets.
turer's National Bank of Detroit (hereinafter "Bank") and gave a chattel mortgage on an
automobile as security. Lewis, 364 US at 603. Bank did not record the chattel mortgage for
four days, leaving a four-day period where the security interest was unperfected. Id at 604.
The bankruptcy referee had held that the mortgage was void as against the trustee because
a hypothetical creditor could have lent money during the four-day period and had priority
over Bank, and since the trustee could take the place of the hypothetical lien creditor by
virtue of Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, the mortgage was void as against the trustee. Id
at 604. The district court overruled the referee, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court. Id at 604-05. Justice Douglas affirmed the decision of the district court and the Sixth
Circuit. Id at 610.
26. Black's Law Dictionary 832 (West, 5th ed 1979) defines a lien creditor as "one
whose debt or claim is secured by a lien on particular property, as distinguished from a
'general' creditor, who has no such security." A lien creditor is a secured creditor to the
extent of the value of his lien.
27. Lewis, 364 US at 603. The Court in Lewis held that the Bankruptcy Act's Strong
Arm Statute, 11 USC § 110(c), gives a trustee in bankruptcy the status of a hypothetical
lien creditor, as of the bankrupt's filing of his petition, whether such creditor exists or not.
Id at 607.
Section 110(c) of the Bankruptcy Act is the precursor to Section 544 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Vermont Toy Works, 83 Bankr at 292 n 22. Section 544 provides in relevant part,
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard
to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of
the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien
on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a
judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.
11 USC § 544 (1990).
28. In re Kors, Inc., 819 F2d 19, 22 (2d Cir 1987). In Kors, the secured party failed to
obtain the signature of the debtor on the financing statement. Kors, 819 F2d at 23. There-
fore, under Vermont law, the security interest was not perfected. Id. Judge Pierce held,
"since Vermont law gives a lien creditor rights superior to those of an unperfected security
interest, the trustee, pursuant to § 544(a)(1) of the Code, had rights superior to those of the
Bank on the date of the bankruptcy filing." Id.
29. UCC § 9-301(3) (1987).
30. See, for example, New York Uniform Commercial Code § 9-301(3) (McKinney
1991).
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However, note that Judge Hershner in Matter of McElwaney3l
stated that the trustee has no standing to bring forth a marshaling
motion under the Bankruptcy Code's Strong Arm Statute, Section
544,32 because Section 544 was intended to protect the estate from
secret liens, not to give the trustee the power to invoke the mar-
shaling doctrine.33 Nevertheless, Judge Conrad in Vermont Toy
Works asserted that the McElwaney court "duck[ed] the issue" of
standing since the McElwaney court based its decision on a finding
that the senior secured creditor would be prejudiced by the appli-
cation of the doctrine. 4 Judge Conrad also held that the marshal-
ing cause of action (as well as related piercing the corporate veil
actions) are property of the estate pursuant to 11 USC §
541(a)(1).
3 5
Though the trustee, who represents the interests of all creditors,
has standing to pursue marshaling, an unsecured creditor generally
does not have such standing.36 However, "in some cases the doc-
trine is defined strictly in terms of lien or secured creditors. In
other cases, the doctrine is defined in terms of 'interests' that are
not limited to secured creditors or even to creditors." 37 This is a
minority view, but one that could be advanced in the case of great
inequities to give unsecured creditors standing to pursue the
doctrine.38
31. 40 Bankr 66 (Bankr M D Ga 1984). The debtor had purchased 475 acres of land
and assumed the debt owed to Federal Land Bank which was secured by a first lien on the
land. McElwaney, 40 Bankr at 67. The value of the land exceeded the amount of the debt.
Id. The debtor was required to purchase stock in the Federal Land Bank and pledge this
stock as well as the land. Id. The Farmers Home Administration had a second lien on the
land. Id. When the debtor filed for Bankruptcy (Chapter 7), the trustee moved for the Fed-
eral Land Bank to satisfy its claim from the land, with the remainder of the land proceeds
to go to Farmers Home Association, leaving the stock as an asset of the estate. Id. Judge
Hershner held that the trustee could not invoke marshaling and improve its position to the
detriment of the secured creditors through Section 544. Id at 70-71.
32. 11 USC § 544 (1990). See note 27 and accompanying text for the text of Section
544 and its application to the trustee's standing in a marshaling case.
33. McElwaney, 40 Bankr at 70-71.
34. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 295.
35. Id at 297-98. 11 USC § 541(a)(1) states that "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property" are property of the bankrupt estate. 11 USC § 541(a)(1) (1990).
36. In re Mesa Intercontinental, Inc., 79 Bankr 669, 672 (Bankr S D Tex 1987). In
Mesa, the bankruptcy court held that where the proponent of marshaling was an unsecured
creditor, it could not successfully pursue marshaling. Mesa, 79 Bankr at 672.
37. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 299, quoting 53 Am Jur 2d Marshaling Assets §
1 (1970).
38. Note that in Vermont Toy Works the unsecured creditor's attorney prosecuted
the marshaling defense because the trustee was unwilling to expend resources on the de-
fense. However, the relief granted by the bankruptcy court solely benefitted the bankrupt's
318
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The last party in interest, the debtor, cannot invoke the doc-
trine."9 However, a debtor in possession has the same rights as a
trustee in bankruptcy for standing purposes.40 Therefore, in a
Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor, as debtor in possession, would
have standing to pursue marshaling.
C. Due Process Requirements
The shareholder/guarantor must be a party to the bankruptcy
proceedings for due process purposes. 41 Also, the "request for mar-
shaling must be brought as an adversary proceeding pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 7001 et seq."'42 But, note that an adversary pro-
ceeding as defined by Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7) includes a "pro-
ceeding to obtain an injunction or other relief."' 43 Therefore, this
estate. The unsecured creditor benefitted indirectly from his efforts in that there were more
assets to be distributed to the unsecured creditors after his successful prosecution of the
doctrine. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 267 n 10.
39. Sowell v Federal Reserve Bank, 268 US 449, 456-57. "The debtor may not ordina-
rily invoke the doctrine, for by doing so he would disregard the express provisions of his
contract on which the creditor is entitled to rely." Sowell, 268 US at 456-57.
40. Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code states, "a debtor in possession shall have all
the rights . . . and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a trustee
serving in a case under this chapter." 11 USC § 1107 (1990).
41. In re Coors of N. Miss., Inc., 66 Bankr 845, 869 (Bankr N D Miss 1986). In Coors,
the debtor's principal shareholder, Mr. Moak, negotiated several loans with Planters Bank.
Coors, 66 Bankr at 851. These loans were secured by real property owned by Mr. Moak's
wife, Mrs. Betty Moak. Id. Mrs. Moak was not a party to the proceedings and, therefore,
Judge Houston rejected 'the plaintiff's motion to marshal the real property owned by Mrs.
Moak. Id at 869.
42. Matter of Mel-O-Gold, Inc., 88 Bankr 205, 207 (Bankr S D Iowa 1988).
In Mel-O-Gold, an unsecured creditor requested marshaling through an "ordinary" mo-
tion. Mel-O-Gold, 88 Bankr at 206. Judge Hill held that since the motion was brought on
the creditor's "own initiative, not in response to any type of motion by another party," the
matter was not before the bankruptcy court in an adversary proceeding and therefore the
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. Id.
43. Bankr R 7001(7). In re San Jacinto Glass Indus., Inc., 93 Bankr 934, 937 (Bankr
D Minn 1988), citing Mel-O-Gold, 88 Bankr at 207.
In San Jacinto, the debtor purchased equipment through a purchase money loan ob-
tained from Westinghouse Credit Corporation (hereinafter "WCC"). San Jacinto, 93 Bankr
at 936. This loan was secured by a purchase money security interest and an irrevocable
standby letter of credit, to be drawn by WCC upon a showing of default by the debtor. Id.
The standby letter of credit was personally guaranteed by the debtor's Chairman of the
Board. Id. First City National Bank of Houston, an unsecured creditor with regards to the
equipment and the letter of credit, brought forth a marshaling motion in response to WCC's
request for relief from stay and the debtor's motion to sell more assets. Id at 937. Judge
Mahoney held that "under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7), marshaling can be requested in re-
sponse to any type of motion brought by another party and in that context need not be filed
as an adversary proceeding." Id. However, First City's motion for marshaling was denied
because it had failed to show inequitable conduct by the guarantor, inducement to extend
credit, or evidence that would justify piercing of the corporate veil. Id at 941.
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requirement is usually met.
D. Burden of Proof
The bankruptcy court in Vermont Toy Works stated that the
proponent of marshaling has the burden of proving the elements or
expansions of the marshaling doctrine by clear and convincing evi-
dence.44 In addition, the proponent must also show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the secured creditor will not be
prejudiced by application of the doctrine. 45 Therefore, to success-
fully invoke traditional marshaling, the proponent must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the following elements are
present:
1. The existence of two creditors of the same debtor; and
2. The existence of two funds belonging to a common debtor;
with
3. Only one of the creditors having access to both funds; with
4. The absence of prejudice to the senior secured creditor if the
doctrine is applied.
Based on these traditional requirements of marshaling, espe-
cially the common debtor requirement, a court will not compel
First Bank to marshal Mr. Doe's assets, in lieu of ABC Corpora-
tion's assets, even though Mr. Doe is the sole shareholder of the
corporation.46 The traditional requirements of marshaling are obvi-
ously not present in the hypothetical facts. However, Second Bank
may be able to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the
recognized expansions of the "common debtor" requirement:
A. General Equity Principles
B. Contributions to Capital Theory
C. Inequitable Conduct of the Parties
D. Piercing of the Corporate Veil
44. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 314.
45. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 323. But see In re Century Brass Prods., 95
Bankr 277 (D Conn 1989), where Judge Cabranes stated:
We see no basis for BOBC [junior creditor] to demonstrate lack of prejudice to GECC
[senior creditor] by "clear and convincing evidence,". . . we do hold that, in light of
the prejudice to GECC this record suggests, BOBC's failure to submit any evidence at
all regarding lack of prejudice allowed a conclusion that marshalling [sic] of assets
would indeed prejudice GECC.
Century Brass, 95 Bankr at 280, quoting Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 323. Judge
Cabranes found that the possibility that GECC would not be fully satisfied if marshaling
were applied was prejudicial to GECC. Century Brass, 95 Bankr at 279. On this basis, the
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision not to permit marshaling. Id at 280.
46. Gibson, 7 Bankr at 440. See notes 17, 62-65 and accompanying text.
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EXPANSIONS OF THE MARSHALING DOCTRINE
A. General Equity Principles
Berman v Green47 is a leading case for expansion of the doctrine
based on general equitable considerations. Green is currently the
only circuit court decision discussing marshaling in this context.
Although the case is highly criticized, both in cases fromn other cir-
cuits48 and law reviews,49 it is still good law in the Eighth Circuit.50
In Green, Judge Henley held,
In this case it would be in the highest degree inequitable to allow the Bank
to exhaust the business assets of the corporate bankrupt without first look-
ing to' the real estate mortgaged to it [by the individual shareholders]. To
permit such a course would leave the general creditors of the business with
nothing.51
47. 597 F2d 130 (8th Cir 1979). In Green, the Centennial Bank and Trust of Mission,
Kansas, (hereinafter "Centennial Bank") had made loans to the debtor corporation secured
by the debtor's assets and the real property holdings of the guarantors. Green, 597 F2d at
131. The debtor corporation and the guarantors later filed for bankruptcy. Id at 132. The
liquidation value of the business assets was $28,000, significantly less than the $65,000 owed
Centennial Bank. Id. The real estate was valued at $135,000. Id. Judge Henley affirmed the
district court's order which affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, that the bank marshal
the real estate assets of the guarantors, leaving the business assets, $28,000, to the trustee.
Id. Judge Henley's decision was grounded "largely on the basis of Judge Clark's well-rea-
soned opinion" in the district court. Id.
See notes 52-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Clark's opinion.
48. See, for example, McElwaney, 40 Bankr at 71-72, criticizing the Green court for
not determining whether there would be prejudice to the senior secured creditor before in-
voking the marshaling doctrine; In re The Computer Room, Inc., 24 Bankr 732, 737 (Bankr
N D Ala 1982) (where Judge Wright rejected the Green decision, but allowed marshaling
because the traditional elements of marshaling were all present); In re United Medical Re-
search, Inc., 12 Bankr 941, 942-43 (Bankr C D Ca 1981) (stating that it was not clear what
the Green court considered equitable in the case). Id.
49. Benjamin Weintraub and Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: Com-
pelling a Senior Lienor to Pursue Remedies Against a Guarantor-A Misapplication of the
Marshaling Doctrine, 18 UCC L J 178, 179-82; Irving D. Labovitz, Marshaling under the
UCC: The State of the Doctrine, 99 Bank L J 440, 446 (1982).
50. See Matter of Clary House, Inc., 11 Bankr 462 (Bankr W D Mo 1981), where the
bankruptcy court granted marshaling of assets of the guarantor and denied equitable subro-
gation to the guarantor where the guarantor's liability was equivalent to that of a co-maker's
because the guarantor had waived presentment and demand in the guaranty agreement.
Clary, 11 Bankr at 466-67. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court held that when
property other than that which otherwise would go into the estate is available to the
secured creditor, "it would be in the highest degree inequitable to allow the (creditor)
to exhaust the assets of the (estate) without first looking to the real estate mortgaged
to it. To permit such a course would leave the general creditors of the (estate) with
nothing."
Id at 467, quoting Green, 597 F2d at 133.
51. Green, 597 F2d at 133.
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The Eighth Circuit then affirmed the bankruptcy court's order
that the bank marshal the assets of the individual shareholders.
52
Although the cases criticize Green, this may be due to the
Eighth Circuit opinion's lack of explanation of the inequities in-
volved, though Judge Henley stated that he relied on the district
court's findings in making his decision.5 Unfortunately, the dis-
trict court's opinion was not submitted for publication until 1986,
seven years after the Eighth Circuit's decision. 4 The district
court's opinion merely suggested that the marshaling order was
based on "general equitable principles. '55 Judge Clark of the dis-
trict court decided that the interests of general equitable principles
should prevail and he invoked marshaling, even when the parties
did not act inequitably.56
In summary, a court accepting the General Equity Principles ex-
pansion of the marshaling doctrine would compel marshaling when
it would be highly inequitable for marshaling not to be applied.
57
B. Contributions to Capital Theory
The Contribution to Capital Expansion is based on the assertion
that a personal guaranty can be considered an equitable contribu-
tion to the capital of a corporation .5  Judge Buschman in In re
Tampa Chain Co.5 stated that,
Several courts have held that when a guarantor who is also a controlling
shareholder provides the lender with the primary collateral needed to ob-
tain a working capital loan to either initiate or continue the operation of the
debtor corporation, the "common debtor" requirement is satisfied and the
equitable remedy of marshaling is available.60
52. Id at 132.
53. "We affirm the ruling of the district court and do so largely on the basis of Judge
Clark's well reasoned opinion." Id.
54. Berman v Green, 65 Bankr 317 (Bankr W D Mo 1978).
55. Berman, 65 Bankr at 320.
56. Id.
57. Green, 597 F2d at 133. See notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
58. Farmers and Merchants Bank v Gibson, 7 Bankr 437, 441 (Bankr N D Fla 1980).
See note 17 and notes 62 to 65 and accompanying text.
59. 53 Bankr 772 (Bankr S D NY 1985). In Tampa Chain, the shareholder guarantor
was found to have acted inequitably by abusing the corporation's funds. Tampa Chain, 53
Bankr at 779. Judge Buschman held that the shareholder's guaranty was an equitable con-
tribution of capital and invoked marshaling on those grounds. Id at 778. See notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
60. Tampa Chain, 53 Bankr at 778, suggesting a comparison of Berman v Green, 597
F2d 130 (8th Cir 1979), In re Multiple Servs. Indus., Inc., 18 Bankr 635 (Bankr E D Wis
1982), and Gibson, 7 Bankr at 440-41 with In re The Computer Room, 24 Bankr at 735 n 4,
and In re United Medical Research, Inc., 12 Bankr 941, 943 (Bankr C D Cal 1981).
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The bankruptcy court in In re United Medical Research, Inc.61
extended this reasoning and stated that "on principle there is no
difference between a stockholder loan to a corporation and that
stockholder loaning his credit to the corporation by securing his
guarantee of a corporate debt with individual assets.
'62
The leading case in this area is Farmers and Merchants Bank v
Gibson. The Gibson court held that where a sole shareholder
guaranteed a working capital loan, and the secured creditor was
relying solely on the guarantor and not the debtor corporation for
repayment, the guarantee will be viewed as a contribution to capi-
tal, and marshaling would be appropriate. 4 Judge Sauls, in Gib-
son, stated that the foreseeable result of obtaining a working capi-
tal loan, based on the personal guaranty of a shareholder of the
corporation, was the "inducement of others to innocently com-
mence or continue to extend supplies or services to the principal
on credit."65 Thus, when the business failed, the "balance of equi-
ties tip[ped] in favor of the creditors of the principal.
'66
This theory is based in equity, and therefore "the contributions
to capital exception to marshaling should not be applied unless
61. 12 Bankr 941 (Bankr C D Cal 1981).
62. United Medical Research, 12 Bankr at 944. In United Medical Research, the
principal shareholders had guaranteed a Small Business Administration loan and pledged
their real property to secure the guarantees. Id at 941-42. The trustee moved for marshaling
of the real property of the guarantors. Id at 942. After finding that the shareholder guaran-
tors of the debtor corporation had not acted inequitably, Judge Elliott quoted Frasher v
Robinson, 458 F2d 492 (9th Cir 1972), where the Ninth Circuit, finding that the shareholder
lender had not acted inequitably, held that,
Claims of majority shareholders will be subordinated when the majority shareholders
have been involved in fraud, overreaching, or other inequitable conduct. However,
absent inequitable conduct, bona fide claims based upon loans from majority share-
holders will not be subordinated to the claims of other creditors.
United Medical Research, 12 Bankr at 944, quoting Frasher, 458 F2d at 493 (emphasis in
original, citations omitted).
Judge Elliott, in stating that there was no difference between a shareholder loan to a
corporation and a shareholder guaranteeing a loan to the corporation, concluded that with-
out any inequitable conduct on the part of the shareholder guarantor, it would not be ap-
propriate to subordinate the guarantor's claims (presumably after the rights of the secured
creditors were equitably subrogated to the guarantors), and therefore, he refused to apply
the marshaling doctrine (presumably because there would be no net effect on the assets of
the debtor, as the guarantors would be subrogated to the Small Business Administration's
interests). United Medical Research, 12 Bankr at 944.
See note 21 for a discussion on equitable subrogation and subordination.
63. 7 Bankr 437 (Bankr N D Fla 1980). See note 17 for the facts and procedural
history of Gibson.
64. Gibson, 7 Bankr at 441.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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there also exists sufficient inequitable conduct to warrant its appli-
cation."67 The proponent of marshaling must show either that ex-
cessive control was exerted by the guarantors, that the guarantees
were treated as a capital contribution, or that the corporation was
undercapitalized. 8
C. Inequitable Conduct
When the guarantor of a debt conducts his affairs inequitably, a
court is more likely to compel marshaling.69 An example of inequi-
table conduct is found in Tampa Chain, where within the first
three months after receiving a loan from Fundex Corporation, the
guarantors diverted 56% of all cash disbursements to themselves,
their relatives, or controlled entities. 0 In finding the shareholder
guarantor's conduct inequitable, Judge Buschman quoted Matter
of Harvest Milling Co.,71 which held:
Inequitable conduct is that conduct which may be lawful, yet shocks one's
good conscience. It means, inter alia, a secret or open fraud, lack of good
faith or guardianship by a fiduciary; an unjust enrichment, not enrichment
by bon chance, astuteness or business acumen, but enrichment through an-
other's loss brought about by one's own unconscionable, unjust, unfair, close
or double dealing or foul conduct.
72
Inequitable conduct was evidenced by certain "badges of fraud" in
Tampa Chain.13
67. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 319.
68. Id at 317.
69. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 319, referring to Tampa Chain, 53 Bankr at
772.
70. Tampa Chain, 53 Bankr at 775.
71. 221 F Supp 836 (D Or 1963). In Harvest Milling, Judge East found no evidence
of inequitable conduct on the part of a corporate creditor, Concentrates Inc., even when the
bankrupt debtor held shares in the creditor corporation. Harvest Milling, 221 F Supp at
838-39. The court held that without evidence of inequitable conduct, equitable subordina-
tion of the creditor's claim was not warranted. Id.
72. Tampa Chain, 53 Bankr at 779, quoting In re Harvest Milling, 221 F Supp at
838, and also quoted with approval in Andrew DeNatale and Prudence B. Abram, The Doc-
trine of Equitable Subordination As Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus Law
417, 424 n 35 (1985)(emphasis in original).
73. In Tampa Chain, Judge Buschman stated that the corporate records showed
"continuous use of Tampa Chain as a personal piggy bank [by its shareholders]... " and
that the case was one of "abuse of corporate funds." Tampa Chain, 53 Bankr at 779-80. See
also note 58 and accompanying text.
The Second Circuit in In re Kaiser, 722 F2d 1574 (2d Cir 1983), stated that badges of
fraud could be used to find the actual intent to commit fraud. Kaiser, 722 F2d at 1582. The
Second Circuit listed the following as badges of fraud,
concealment of facts and false pretenses by the transferor, reservation by him of
rights in the transferred property, his absconding with or secreting the proceeds of
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Thus, under this expansion, when the proponent of marshaling
can show inequitable conduct on the part of the guarantor, a court
acting in equity may view the guarantor and the corporation as a
common debtor, and thereby allow the invocation of marshaling.
D. Piercing of the Corporate Veil
Piercing the corporate veil is used by courts to disregard the sep-
arateness of the corporate entity and its shareholders. Judge Con-
rad in Vermont Toy listed ten factors that courts have used to de-
termine the appropriateness of piercing the corporate veil. 4
Piercing the corporate veil is perhaps the most recognized ex-
pansion of marshaling's common debtor requirement.76 Although
piercing of the corporate veil is recognized as an expansion of the
common debtor requirement, many courts have declined to invoke
the doctrine because the proponent has not met the high standard
of proof, clear and convincing evidence, required to rebut the pre-
sumption of separate entities.
76
the transfer immediately after the receipt, the existence of an unconscionable dis-
crepancy between the value, of property transferred and the consideration received
therefor,. . . lack or inadequacy of consideration, family, friendship, or close associa-
tion relationship between the parties, the retention of possession, benefit, or use of
the property in question, the financial condition of the party sought to be charged
before and after the transaction, and shifting of assets by the debtor to a corporation
wholly controlled by him.
Id at 1582-83 (citations omitted).
74. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 307. The factors listed by Judge Conrad are,
(1) The corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetrating fraud; (2) A corporation
is organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit of another corporation;
(3) The corporate fiction is employed as a means to the end of avoiding existing legal
or moral obligations; (4) Failure to observe proper corporate formalities or there is an
absence of corporate records or meetings; (5) Gross undercapitalization or thin capi-
talization; (6) Non-functioning of other officers or directors; (7) Corporation is a mere
facade for the operations of the dominant stockholder(s); (8) Insolvency of the debtor
corporation; (9) Siphoning or commingling of corporate funds by the dominant stock-
holder; and, (10) The corporate fiction is used to achieve or perpetrate monopoly.
Id (citations omitted). See also 18 Am Jur 2d Corporations §§ 43-54 (1985).
75. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 320. See Tampa Chain, 53 Bankr at 778 (which
accepted the piercing the corporate veil expansion, but decided to invoke marshaling on the
separate grounds of the contribution of capital expansion); Gibson, 7 Bankr at 440 (ac-
cepting the piercing expansion but also refusing to pierce the corporate veil when the contri-
bution to capital expansion was available to impose marshaling against the guarantor); Ver-
mont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 321 (holding that "marshaling's 'common debtor'
requirement is met where there are sufficient facts to warrant piercing of the corporate's veil
to reach and join the alter ego's assets with those of the senior creditor").
76. Vermont Toy Works, 82 Bankr at 320. See for example, Matter of Dealer Sup-
port Servs. Int'l, Inc., 73 Bankr 763, 765 (Bankr E D Mich 1987), where the bankruptcy
court held that although it accepted the alter ego expansion of the doctrine, the trustee had
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APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
An analysis of the ABC Corporation hypothetical under each ex-
pansion follows:77
A. General Equity Principles
The expansion of the doctrine based on general equitable princi-
ples is met. It is clear from the fact pattern that if First Bank is
permitted to recover from the corporate assets, Fund 1, first, there
will be no assets available to satisfy Second Bank or the trade
creditors. Under any circumstances, First Bank will have to pro-
ceed against Mr. Doe on the personal guaranty if it is to be fully
satisfied, because the liquidation value of the corporate assets
($250,000) is less than the debt owed ($300,000). Therefore there is
no prejudice to First Bank if it is forced to marshal the personal
assets of Mr. Doe. Because Second Bank and the trade creditors
would be left with nothing if First Bank's decision to liquidate the
corporate assets first is permitted, a court accepting the expansion
of the common debtor requirement based on general equitable
principles would allow marshaling under this fact pattern.
B. Contribution to Capital
The requirements -f this expansion of the doctrine are not nec-
essarily met under the above fact pattern. There is no indication
that First Bank relied solely on the personal guaranty to make the
loan. In fact, the financial projections provided by Mr. Doe indi-
not alleged inequitable conduct on the part of the guarantors. Thus, even if a court were to
accept the application of the doctrine, without the equitable subordination of the guaran-
tor's subrogation claim, the order to marshal assets would be futile. Dealer Support Servs.,
73 Bankr at 765-66.
See also In re Coors of N. Miss., Inc., 66 Bankr 845, 867 (Bankr N D Miss 1986); Matter
of Franchise Systems, Inc., 46 Bankr 158, 163 (Bankr N D Ga. 1985); In re Rich Supply
House, Inc., 43 Bankr 68, 70 (Bankr N D Ill 1984); DuPage Lumber & Home Improvement
Co. v Georgia-Pacific Corp., 34 Bankr 737, 741 (N D Ill 1983); In re Plad, Inc., 24 Bankr
676, 679 (Bankr M D Tenn 1982); Matter of Harrold's Hatchery and Poultry Farms, Inc.,
17 Bankr 712, 717 (Bankr M D Ga 1982), which all accepted the piercing expansion of the
marshaling doctrine, but refused to invoke marshaling because of the proponent's failure to
carry his standard of proof or to allege sufficient facts to warrant piercing of the corporate
veil.
77. The following analysis -assumes that all procedural requirements are met. Specifi-
cally, it is assumed that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the parties, Second Bank
and the trustee have standing, the marshaling issue is presented in an adversary proceeding,
and all facts have been stipulated to and therefore meet the burden of proof requirement of




cated that the corporate assets would at all times exceed the
amount owed First Bank. In addition, though Mr. Doe acted ineq-
uitably when he used the proceeds from the second loan to repay
his student loans, this act alone may not suffice to show, by clear
and convincing evidence, that Mr. Doe acted inequitably.
However, ABC was undercapitalized from the beginning. Mr.
Doe, knowing that the company needed capital, obtained the
$300,000 loan from First Bank when he incorporated. It can also be
shown that the trade creditors relied on the fact that the two
banks loaned large amounts to ABC in extending credit to the
company.
If the court accepts United Medical Research's extreme ap-
proach that any personal guaranty of a corporate debt is a contri-
bution to capital,78 the court will require marshaling under this ex-
pansion of the common debtor requirement.
Overall, the court may invoke marshaling based on the reliance
of the trade creditors, the initial undercapitalization (recognized
by Mr. Doe when he incorporated), and the slightly inequitable
conduct on the part of Mr. Doe.
C. Inequitable Conduct
Mr. Doe's only inequitable conduct was the use of $10,000 of the
Second Bank loan proceeds to repay his student loans. However,
this was only 20% of the second loan proceeds, and less than 3%
of the total bank loan proceeds. Mr. Doe's conduct has not re-
vealed a pattern of fraud or inequitable conduct. His one act
should be insufficient to invoke this expansion of the common
debtor requirement.
D. Piercing the Corporate Veil
There is insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of sepa-
rate entities by piercing the corporate veil. Although the corpora-
tion was inadequately capitalized when it was formed, Mr. Doe re-
alized this and obtained the necessary capital throfigh the First
Bank loan. In addition, the corporation was not an alter ego or
instrumentality of Mr. Doe, nor was the corporation used to per-
petuate fraud or inequitable conduct, Though the corporation did
not follow all corporate formalities, it did file separate tax returns
and detailed financial records were maintained. Overall, there is
78. 12 Bankr at 943. See note 61 and accompanying text.
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insufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil, and this expan-
sion of the common debtor requirement could not be used by a
bankruptcy court to invoke marshaling.
In summary, marshaling would be permitted in the above fact
pattern under the general equitable principles and possibly the
contribution to capital expansions of the common debtor require-
ments. Marshaling would not be invoked under the inequitable
conduct or piercing the corporate veil expansions.
CONCLUSION
The weakness of the first two expansions of the marshaling doc-
trine are exemplified by this result. Many corporations use the fi-
nancial tool of leverage to fund their growth and success. With the
use of leverage, the risk of failure increases because there is more
financial pressure on the corporation. If a jurisdiction follows the
general equitable or contribution to capital expansions of the mar-
shaling doctrine, small business owners that use leverage face the
threat of having their personal assets marshaled to satisfy any and
all debts of the corporation. In addition, the use of leverage is a
useful and well-recognized financial tool that would be taken out of
the hands of would-be entrepreneurs and small business owners.
This would nullify one of the most important benefits of having a
corporate entity: limited liability.
There is no need for this extreme approach because most credi-
tors, even trade creditors, have procedures for assessing credit risk
and making the decision to extend credit or not. Under these ex-
pansions, junior or unsecured creditors are able to improve their
position, to the detriment of the guarantor, merely because they
made a poor credit decision.
In addition, most new jobs in the United States economy are
created by small businesses and entrepreneurs. 9 These ventures
are generally started by an entrepreneur with an idea and some
79. John Case, The New Economy: The Disciples of David Birch, 11 Inc. 39 (January
1989). Although estimates of the number of new jobs created by small businesses (less than
one hundred employees) vary, small businesses create a significant number of new jobs in
the economy. Case, The New Economy at 40 (cited within this note). Mr. Birch estimated
that small businesses created 82% of the new jobs created between 1969 and 1976. Id. This
figure was disputed by researchers at the Brookings Institute, but the variations between
the two studies were insignificant compared to variations between different states and dif-
ferent time periods. Id. During economic recession or slow growth, the percentage of jobs
created by small businesses increases, and vice versa. Id. In fact, between 1969 and 1986, the
percentage of new jobs created by small companies ranged from 38% to 100%, with all but
one time period having 53% of new jobs or more created by small companies. Id at 39
Vol. 30:309
Comments
capital. Many times, the entrepreneur must seek outside financing,
including debt, in order to achieve growth. As stated earlier, most
large creditors require both a security interest in corporate assets
and a personal guaranty.80 The business owner should be able to
estimate his potential exposure on the personal guaranty using his
financial projections. Based on these estimates, he can decide
whether to accept the loan or not.
If a jurisdiction applies the general equity or contribution to
capital expansions of the marshaling doctrine, a business owner
can have unlimited liability, regardless of his personal actions. In
light of the availability of credit reports and credit risk awareness
among all businesses, it is not necessary or desirable to give impru-
dent creditors the ability to improve their position at the expense
of the guarantor as this would have a chilling effect on entrepre-
neurship. As Judge Elliott stated in United Medical Research:
It is poor policy for courts to upset legitimate business transactions because
of some vague concept of equity. We tend to forget that these decisions
affect future commercial transactions. Advantageous and proper loans to
corporations may be frustrated because shareholders would be fearful of
having their personal assets marshaled for corporate creditors should they
guarantee a corporate debt.8 1
These concerns are not valid, however, when a court invokes
marshaling based on inequitable conduct on the part of the guar-
antor or piercing of the corporate veil. When the personal guaran-
tor acts fraudulently or inequitably, justice would not be served by
allowing the guarantor to harm creditors through his inequitable
conduct, yet not be personally liable for his misappropriation of
funds or other fraudulent conduct. In addition, by definition, if the
corporate veil is pierced, the guarantor and the corporation are the
same. Therefore, the inequitable conduct and piercing the corpo-
rate veil expansions of the common debtor requirement of mar-
shaling are acceptable because these exceptions are based on the
activities of the personal guarantor. The guarantor is still able to
limit his exposure by not acting inequitably and maintaining the
corporation as a separate entity. Thus, acceptance of these expan-
sions of the marshaling doctrine will not have a dramatic effect on
entrepreneurs' willingness to risk their personal funds to start-up
new businesses and create jobs.
Therefore it is urged that the judiciary limit the expansion of
80. See note 1 and accompanying text.
81. United Medical Research, 12 Bankr at 943.
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the marshaling doctrine to the inequitable conduct and piercing
the corporate veil expansions. This limitation will yield a just re-
sult when the personal guarantor acts improperly (either inequita-
bly or by not maintaining a separate entity), while allowing an en-
trepreneur the ability to estimate and limit his personal exposure
when deciding to start a venture.
Mdny Emamzadeh
